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SUPREME
COURT WATCH
By Reginald C. Oh

I

n its 2004-05 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a
constitutional challenge to the State ofCalifornia's practice
of temporarily racially segregating its prisoners. On No
vember 2, 2004, the Court heard oral arguments in Johnson v.
California, No. 03-636, a lawsuit brought by an African
American prison inmate in the California Department of
Corrections. The petitioner contends that the state's long
standing policy ofracially segregating prisoners for sixty days
violates the Equal Protection Clause. On February 23, 2005,
the Court issued its opinion in]ohnson v. California, 125 S.
Ct. 1141 (2005), and held that the policy of racially segre
gating prisoners must be subject to strict scrutiny.
The petitioner, Garrison Johnson, is an African-American
prisoner currently serving his prison term for murder, robbery,
and assault with a deadly weapon. He entered the California
Institute for Men in Chino, California, on June 22, 1987.
Upon a prisoner's arrival at a corrections facility, it is the policy
ofthe CDC to initially house the prisoner in a reception cen
ter for sixty days, where he undergoes various physical, mental,
and emotional evaluations. All inmates, including both new
inmates and inmates transferring from another CDC prison
facility, are initially housed in the reception center.
Johnson's equal protection claim focused on the CDC's
policy of taking race into account when determining dou
ble-cell placements at the reception center. Each inmate is as
signed a cellmate, and the CDC takes into consideration var
ious factors in assigning an inmate's cellmate. One of those
factors is the race ofthe prisoners, and the state concedes that
race is a dominant factor in double-cell placement decisions.
The CDC categorizes inmates into four general racial cate
gories-black, white, Asian, and other-and all prisoners are
assigned a cellmate ofhis own race.
The petitioner in this case had been through several in
mate reception centers in the CDC system, and at each fa
cility, he was initially assigned an African-American cell
mate. He brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
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Central District of California, challenging the racial assign
ment policy as a violation of his equal protection. The dis
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the CDC
administrators, concluding that they were entitled to quali
fied immunity because their actions clearly did not violate a
constitutional right. The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals af
firmed the district court ruling.Johnson v. California, 321
F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner then appealed the Ninth
Circuit ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A central issue in this case is the question regarding the ap
propriate standard ofreview. Under equal protection law, typ
ically, laws that classify on the basis ofrace are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. Laws that employ racial classifications are
treated as presumptively unconstitutional, and such laws will
survive strict scrutiny only if the state can put forth a com
pelling state interest in discriminating on the basis ofrace and
if the racial classification is necessary to serve that compelling
state interest. Historically, under strict scrutiny review, the
Court has struck down laws that discriminated on the basis
ofrace, holding that in each case, the government has failed to
meet its heavy burden ofjustifying racial discrimination.
Injohnson, however, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding the
constitutionality of California's policy ofracially segregating
prison inmates, did not use the strict scrutiny standard ofre
view. Instead, it relied on the Turner test developed by the
Supreme Court to analyze constitutional claims in the prison
context. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In Turner,
the Court adopted a deferential standard of review for ana
lyzing constitutional challenges brought by prisoners. To de
termine if a prison regulation violates an inmate's constitu
tional rights, the Court ruled that a regulation will be valid if
it is reasonably related to serving legitimate penological in
terests. Id at 89.
Under the Turner test, four factors are analyzed to deter
mine the constitutionality of a prison regulation. "First, there
must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regu
lation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it." Id. Second, there must be "alternative means of ex
ercising the right that remains open to prison inmates." Id. at
90. Third, a court must assess "the impact accommodation of
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.
Id. Finally, a court must determine if the prison had alternatives
for achieving the same end. "The absence ofready alternatives
is evidence ofthe reasonableness ofa prison regulation." Id.
In applying the four-part Turner test to the facts in]ohn
son, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the temporary racial
segregation of inmates in reception centers did not violate
equal protection. First, the court held that there is a valid, ra
tional connection between the regulation and the govern
ment's legitimate interest, concluding that racial segregation
ofinmates is rationally related to furthering the state's interState & Local Law News, Volume 28, Number 3, Spring 2005

est in protecting the safety of inmates and staff Both sides
agreed that inmate violence along racial lines was a serious
and legitimate concern, and that court reasoned that tempo
rary racial segregation of inmates was related to reducing
racial violence and maintaining a safe prison environment.
Second, the court held that inmates had alternative means
of exercising their constitutional rights. The policy only re
quired segregation ofinmates for sixty days during their stay
in the reception center. After the sixty day period is up, inmates
are then assigned cellmates in a racially neutral manner. Thus,
the court concluded that overall, inmates could exercise their
right to be free from race conscious decision-making while an
inmate in the California prison system.
Third, the court assessed the impact ofplaintiff's request
ed accommodation, and held that "failing to consider race in
making initial housing assignments would lead to increased
racial violence both in the cells and in the common areas." Fi
nally, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that
there were any reasonable alternatives to deal with the problem
ofracial violence between inmates. In holding that the CDC's
policy does not violate equal protection, the court asserted that
the Turner test requires that the state be given great deference
in how it regulates its prisons and its inmates. The court inter
preted Turner as having "lowered the prison administrators'
burden to justify race-based policies." 321 F. 3d at 798.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision, holding that the Turner test is inapplicable
in determining the constitutionality ofracial segregation in
prisons.Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1148--49. Instead, the Court re
iterated the principle that all racial classifications must be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny, even racial classifications
used in the prison context. Id. at 1148. The Court, however,
determined the appropriate standard ofreview, but it did not
decide the ultimate question regarding the constitutionality
of California's policy of racial segregation, leaving that deci
sion for the lower courts.
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority,
while Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which Justice Scalia
joined.Justice Thomas would have applied the Turner test
and would have upheld California's policy ofracial segrega
tion. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the
majority did not go far enough and that it should have ruled
that the policy is unconstitutional instead of remanding the
case to the lower courts.
In holding that the proper standard of review is strict
scrutiny, the Court reasoned that applying the deferential
Turner test to an equal protection challenge to the govern
ment's practice of racial segregation is inconsistent with the
Court's recent equal protection rulings in which it has em
phatically declared that there are very few contexts in which
de jure racial discrimination and segregation can ever be jus
tified. Id at 1146. In Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003),
for example, the Court upheld race-conscious affirmative ac
tion programs, but in doing so, it reaffirmed that even "be
nign'' racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny,
and it strongly hinted that it would permit the use ofaffirma
tive action programs for only twenty-five more years.
State & Local Law News, Volume 28, Number 3, Spring 2005

Furthermore, the Court reasoned that upholding govern
ment sponsored racial segregation in the prison context
would conflict with the view that governmental reliance on
racial classifications makes it harder to achieve a color-blind
society in which race truly becomes a morally irrelevant factor
in governmental and private decision-making. See id. at 1147.
The Court reasoned that the State of California's reliance on
racial segregation as a tool for prison management may end
up reinforcing racial divisions, racial stereotypes, and inter
racial conflicts, and thus contribute to the very racial violence
that it is purportedly seeking to prevent through its policy. Id.
However, while the Court made it clear what standard of
review must apply to determine the constitutionality ofracial
segregation in prisons, in Johnson, the Court declined to
apply strict scrutiny to the facts of the case, and instead, re
manded the case for either the district court or the court of
appeals to determine whether California's policy meets the
strict scrutiny test.
Thus, even after the Court's decision in]ohnson, a critical
question remains unanswered: does racial segregation in pris
ons violate the Equal Protection Clause? There is a strong
possibility that the lower court may uphold the practice of
racial segregation even under strict scrutiny analysis. Clearly,
the state has a compelling interest in preserving safety and in
preventing racial violence in prisons. The critical question on
remand, therefore, will be whether the temporary racial seg
regation of all inmates entering the reception center is nar
rowly tailored or necessary to further the state's compelling
interest. If the court accepts the contention that racial segre
gation may sometimes be necessary to reduce racial violence
in prisons, the court would be hard pressed to deny the state
an effective tool in preventing death and injury to inmates
and prison staff Given the strong interests at stake, and the
potential loss oflife that could result if the state is required
to discontinue its racial segregation policy, the court may very
well be able to conclude that there are no other effective
means to prevent racial violence besides racial segregation.
The case that might ultimately provide the best rationale
for a decision declaring that racial segregation in prisons
meets the strict scrutiny test is the infamous Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), decision. In that case,
while purporting to apply a rigorous form ofjudicial scruti
ny, the Court upheld the evacuation and internment of
Japanese and Japanese Americans during World War II, even
though the government put forth no real credible evidence
that persons ofJapanese ancestry posed a threat to national
security. The Court deferred to the judgment ofthe federal
government and military officials, and given the high stakes
involved, permitted the deprivation of civil liberties on the
basis of one's race or national origin.
Thus, in Johnson, Korematsu would also justify giving some
deference to the government, even under strict scrutiny, given
the state's compelling goal ofpreserving prison security and of
preventing unnecessary deaths and injury. Just as in Koremat
su., when wartime provided exigent circumstances justifying a
government policy of racial segregation, the always dangercontinued on page 19
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ous prison context similarly provides an ongoing emergency
situation in which the threat oferuption ofracial violence may
require deference to the state in how it decides to regulate its
prison systems.
While the Korematsu decision has justly been criticized for
justifying racial paranoia and invidious racial subordination, it
still remains good constitutional law, and even though the
court may not cite to the case in justifying its decision, the un
derlying principle of Korematsu may very well be the implicit
doctrinal basis for giving prison administrators some discre
tion and authority to engage in racial segregation in the
prison context. Thus, even though the Court held that strict
judicial scrutiny is necessary to determine the constitutional
ity ofracial segregation in prisons, there is a possibility that
strict scrutiny ultimately may not be fatal in fact.
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